Well, this took awhile to get through the courts. Here is the PDF
To announce that there must be no criticism of the President, or that we are to stand by the President, right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public. — Theodore Roosevelt www.reuters.com/legal/govern…
— Greg Mussio (@gregmussio.bsky.social) September 12, 2026 at 8:18 AM
[image or embed]
From the PDF
The plaintiffs in this civil action—several labor unions—have sued the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management (“OPM”), its director, Scott Kupor, and the United States to challenge the
lawfulness of a question that has appeared in thousands of job applications to fill vacancies with
the federal civil service. The question asks, in relevant part, that the applicant “[i]dentify one or
two relevant Executive Orders or policy initiatives that are significant to [the applicant], and
explain how [the applicant] would help implement them if hired.” (Compl., Ex. A at 10 (dkt. no.
1-1).) The plaintiffs assert that the challenged question violates the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”) and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it seeks to assess the
applicant’s “loyalty” to the administration of Donald J Trump
…
“[P]olitical belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the
First Amendment.” Rutan, 497 U.S. at 69 (alteration in original) (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356).
That is why the government bears a “heavy burden” to demonstrate that an inquiry “about an
individual’s beliefs and associations” is “necessary to protect a legitimate state interest.” Baird v.
State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1971). Moreover, “[n]arrow tailoring is crucial where First
Amendment activity is chilled—even if indirectly—‘[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need
breathing space to survive.’” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 609 (2021)
(alteration in original) (finding unconstitutional regulation requiring disclosure of tax-exempt
organizations’ donor information (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). Thus,
“even a ‘legitimate and substantial’ governmental interest ‘cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.’” Id.
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
The plaintiffs are likely to succeed in showing that Question Three is neither related to an
important government interest nor narrowly tailored to promote that interest.5 The defendants seem
to proffer as the important interest at stake the government’s “discretion in administering its hiring
and recruitment processes.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 28.) It is true that, in some cases, an employee’s
political “allegiance” may be a proper consideration where “the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved.” See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518–19 (1980). But that is not the case in the context
of civil service positions because the CSRA expressly prohibits employment decisions made on
the basis of an employee or candidate’s “political affiliation.” See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(E). Here,
the government has not articulated why or how political allegiance is “an appropriate requirement
for the effective performance” of civil service jobs, see Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, yet for the reasons
already detailed in connection with Federal Worker 4’s individual standing, the plaintiffs’
members reasonably interpret Question Three to call for the applicant’s personal political views.
The plaintiffs are thus likely to succeed in showing that there is no legitimate governmental interest
in inquiring into the political beliefs of applicants to federal civil service vacancies.
